Epistemology and the Material Environment :: Philosophy

Epistemology and the Material Environment ABSTRACT: This paper presents an epistemological approach to the investigation of material properties that is opposed to both phenomenalistic epistemology and recent linguistical and ontological accounts of matter/mass terms. Emphasis is laid on the inherent context dependence of material properties. It is shown that, if this is taken seriously, some deep epistemological problems arise, like unavoidable uncertainty, incompleteness, inductivity, and nonderivableness. It is further argued that some widely held epistemological accounts, namely that of essentialism, constructivism, and pragmatism, all reveal some serious defects if related to the recognition of materials. In order to responsibly manage our material environment, a more realistic estimation of our epistemic abilities and prospects is suggested. Introduction: The primacy of epistemology Since a couple of years we may witness a growing philosophical interest in matter(s), material substances, or material beings. (1) Far from their Aristotelean-Thomistic ancestors, today’s philosophers focus on the ontology of matter(s) or the linguistics of mass terms by logical means, provided by analytical philosophy mainly in a Quinian manner. While this has enabled considerable insight in logical and linguistical features, it suffers from a certain sterility with regard to ordinary and, in particular, scientific experience of material/chemical substances. In fact, most accounts leave epistemological problems and presuppositions undiscussed or implicit. Against a (still) prevailing tendency to tell ontological stories based on logical-linguistic analysis, I claim for the primacy of epistemology, i.e. an analysis of the conditions, possibilities and limits of our knowledge gaining processes, that may lead, only in a second step, toward a (linguistically shaped) world view. There is no doubt that linguistic conventions are important constraints of, and even influential on, the social process of knowledge gaining, esp. in science. But these constraints only play a conservative role, while our knowledge of materials tends to change and, as I will show, improve by experimental and conceptual refinements. Moreover, ignoring the non-linguistic constraints, in particular the epistemic conditions of experiencing materials, is even in danger of missing the meaning of our scientific (mass) terms. Starting from an ‘epistemologized’ ontology of matter, I will point out some deeper epistemological problems of material properties, that arise mainly from its inherent context dependence. It turns out, that these problems forces us towards a more modest epistemological position: neither skepticism, nor naive optimism. 1. Ontology epistemologized: material objects The problem of telling a ‘pure’ epistemological story is that it seems to presuppose an ontological starting point: "What is matter?